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Banking Industry Consolidation 
and Market Structure: 
Impact of the Financial Crisis and Recession
David C. Wheelock
The number of U.S. commercial banks and savings institutions declined by 12 percent between
December 31, 2006, and December 31, 2010, continuing a consolidation trend begun in the mid-
1980s. Banking industry consolidation has been marked by sharply higher shares of deposits held
by the largest banks—the 10 largest banks now hold nearly 50 percent of total U.S. deposits. How  -
ever, antitrust policy is predicated on the assumption that banking markets are local in nature, and
enforcement has focused on preventing bank mergers from increasing the concentration of local
banking markets. The author finds little change over time in the average concentration of local
banking markets or the average number of dominant banks in them, even during the recent finan-
cial crisis and recession when numerous bank failures and several large bank mergers occurred.
Concentration did not increase substantially, on average, in markets where mergers occurred among
banks when both the acquiring and acquired banks had existing local offices, though rural markets
generally saw larger increases in concentration from such mergers than did urban markets. Although
the structures of local banking markets, on average, have changed little since the mid-1980s, deposit
concentration has continued to increase at the level of U.S. Census regions. As technology evolves
and the costs of obtaining banking services from distant providers fall further, local market char-
acteristics may become less relevant for analysis of competition in banking. (JEL G21, G28, L41)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2011, 93(6), pp. 419-38.
T
he recent financial crisis and recession
produced a sharp increase in the num-
ber of commercial bank and savings
institution failures in the United States.
Mergers of non-failed commercial banks and sav-
ings institutions (hereafter “banks”) eliminated
still more banks, and in total, the number of U.S.
banks fell by 12 percent between December 31,
2006, and December 31, 2010.1 Over the same
period, the share of total U.S. deposits held by
the 10 largest commercial banks rose from 44 to
49 percent, continuing a trend that began in the
1 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) often resolves
bank failures by arranging mergers of failed institutions with other
banks. These are referred to as “assisted” mergers. Mergers that
do not involve failed institutions are referred to as “unassisted”
mergers. During 2007-10, 270 commercial banks and 54 savings
institutions, representing 4 percent of commercial banks and sav-
ings institutions in operation at the end of 2006, failed; unassisted
mergers absorbed another 893 commercial banks and 109 savings
institutions. These data refer to FDIC-insured commercial banks
and savings institutions located in U.S. states and the District of
Columbia and were obtained from Historical Statistics on Banking,
Tables CB02 and SI02 (http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp).
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U.S. deposits among the largest banks.2
Federal law prohibits any bank from obtain-
ing more than 10 percent of total U.S. deposits
or more than 30 percent of a single state’s total
deposits by acquiring other non-failed banks, and
some states have imposed even lower deposit
share limits.3 Further, antitrust enforcement pre-
vents mergers of non-failed banks that would
significantly increase the concentration of local
banking markets. However, antitrust policy does
not (i) prevent acquisitions of failed banks that
increase local market concentration or (ii) attempt
to limit increases in concentration that do not
result from mergers. Nonetheless, during the
1990s, local urban banking markets generally
did not become significantly more concentrated,
despite increases in the deposit shares of the
largest U.S. and regional banks (Amel, 1996, and
Dick, 2006).
Banking industry consolidation has since
continued, spurred in part by the recent finan-
cial crisis and recession. This article examines
changes since 1999 in the concentration of U.S.
banking markets, defined both at the local level
(metropolitan statistical areas [MSAs] and non-
MSA rural counties) and at the Census-region
level. It examines whether the characteristics of
urban and regional banking markets observed
during the 1990s continued over the subsequent
decade. The article focuses in particular on the
years 2006-10 to gauge whether trends in banking
market structures continued during the financial
crisis and recession. The resolution of failed banks
during 2007-10 did not increase the concentration
of most local banking markets (Wheelock, 2011).
However, unassisted mergers accounted for more
of the decline in the number of U.S. banks during
2007-10 than did bank failures, and therefore
potentially had a larger impact on the structures
of banking markets. 
Following the approach of Dick (2006), this
article uses both the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(HHI) and the number of dominant firms in a
market—that is, the minimum number of banks
that, combined, hold at least 50 percent of a mar-
ket’s total deposits—to measure market concen-
tration. However, unlike Dick (2006), this article
examines trends in the concentration of rural
banking markets as well as MSAs, and it includes
both commercial banks and savings institutions
in the analysis of market concentration (for com-
parison, the article also reports results for commer-
cial banks only).4 Further, the article investigates
the impact of unassisted mergers on banking
market concentration during 2007-10. The results
show that, in general, local banking markets did
not become significantly more concentrated dur-
ing 2006-10 but, as Dick (2006) finds for the 1990s,
concentration increased markedly at the level of
U.S. Census regions.
The next section investigates trends in bank
deposit concentration for both local banking
markets (MSAs and rural counties) and Census
regions. The following section examines trends in
the number of dominant banks, again at the levels
of local banking markets and Census regions.
Subsequently, the article examines the impact of
unassisted mergers during 2007-10 on the concen-
tration of deposits for MSAs and rural counties.
The final section provides study conclusions.
BANKING CONCENTRATION:
LOCAL AND REGIONAL PATTERNS
The recent decline in the number of U.S.
banks has continued a trend dating back to the
mid-1980s (Figure 1). Hundreds of banks failed in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many more were
absorbed through unassisted mergers, spurred
by the relaxation of legal restrictions on bank
Wheelock
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2 In both 1984 and 1993, the 10 largest banks held 15 percent of
total U.S. bank deposits. However, by 1999, the 10 largest banks
held 28 percent of total U.S. bank deposits. These data are for
December 31 of the year indicated for U.S. commercial banks
located in the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
3 Caps on deposit shares were imposed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Adequately capi-
talized banks may exceed the caps by acquiring failing or FDIC-
assisted banks. Banks may also exceed the caps through internally
generated growth. See Spong (2000) for additional details.
4 Regulators consider the presence of savings institutions when
evaluating the implications of proposed bank mergers on market
competition but down-weight the shares of deposits held by sav-
ings institutions by one-half in formal analysis of market concen-
tration. See Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003) for analysis of the methods
and assumptions used by regulators in evaluating banking market
competition.branching by many states and the federal govern-
ment (Amel, 1996).5 The number of U.S. com-
mercial banks reached a post-World War II peak
of 14,495 banks in 1984. By the end of 2010, the
number had fallen to 6,532. Similarly, the number
of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-
insured savings institutions fell from 3,566 to
1,128 over the same period (the number of savings
institutions peaked at 3,740 in 1986).
Despite an increase in the share of total U.S.
deposits held by the very largest banks, the con-
centration of deposits among banks in local mar-
kets changed little, on average, from the mid-1980s
through the 1990s (Amel, 1996, and Dick, 2006).
Furthermore, the advent of interstate bank branch-
ing in 1997 had little immediate impact on either
local banking market concentration or state-level
measures of banking market competition (Dick,
2006, and Yildirim and Mohanty, 2010).6
Bank regulators use Department of Justice
(DOJ) guidelines for market concentration to eval-
uate the competitive effects of proposed bank
mergers and acquisitions. Proposed transactions
that would substantially increase market concen-
tration are subject to more scrutiny and are more
likely to be rejected on antitrust grounds than
transactions that would not increase concentration
significantly. Regulators use data on deposits held
by individual bank branch offices, which banks are
required to report on June 30 of each year, to meas-
ure the concentration of local banking markets.7
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5 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994 permitted interstate branching beginning in 1997 but gave
states the option to restrict de novo branching by banks headquar-
tered in other states. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Section 613) substantially
removed remaining restrictions on interstate branching by elimi-
nating this option.
6 Yildirim and Mohanty (2010) find that state banking markets could
be characterized as monopolistically competitive both before and
after deregulation; however, they also find that the level of com-
petition declined in 30 states after deregulation, increased in 10
states, and did not change significantly in 10 others.
7 Summary of Deposits data are available from the FDIC
(http://ww2.fdic.gov/sod/index.asp).Ordinarily, proposed mergers are not challenged
on competitive grounds unless they would
result in a post-merger HHI value of more than
1800 points and an increase in the index of more
than 200 points in the relevant banking market.8
A premise of antitrust enforcement is that
banking markets are local in nature, and regulators
calculate pro forma HHI values for local banking
markets (typically MSAs or non-MSA rural coun-
ties) to evaluate the competitive implications of
proposed bank mergers.9 In the past, legal restric-
tions on branching and high transportation and
communications costs made it difficult and costly
for the public to obtain services from geographi-
cally distant banks. Further, many studies found
that deposit interest rates were lower, and loan
interest rates were higher, in more concentrated
local banking markets, suggesting that concentra-
tion was an important determinant of the competi-
tiveness of banking markets.10 However, branching
deregulation, along with advances in information-
processing and communications technologies,
have reduced the cost of obtaining financial
services from distant banks and raise the question
whether larger geographic areas, such as states,
Census regions, or even the nation as a whole,
are more relevant for evaluating banking compe-
tition. Nonetheless, studies find that (i) house-
holds and small businesses, to a substantial degree,
continue to obtain their financial services from
banks located in their communities11 and (ii) the
structure of local banking markets continues to
affect the level of competition within those mar-
kets. For example, Hannan and Prager (2004) find
that banks that operate in a single MSA or non-
MSA county market offer lower deposit interest
rates when those markets are more concentrated.
However, the study also finds that the relationship
between local concentration and deposit interest
rates is weaker in markets where the share of
banks operating in more than one market is higher.
Still, the authors conclude that market structure
continues to influence the competitive behavior
of banks operating in local markets.
Dick (2006) investigates whether the level of
bank concentration changed significantly between
1993 and 1999 across MSAs and Census regions
to assess the impact on banking market concentra-
tion of the removal of most restrictions on inter-
state branching in 1997. She finds that the mean
and median HHI values for MSAs declined slightly
between 1993 and 1999, whereas HHI values
increased for all nine Census regions, with the
percentage increases ranging from 17 percent in
the Pacific region to 421 percent in the South
Atlantic region. 
Local Market Concentration
The patterns that Dick (2006) observes for
1993-99 continued in later years. Table 1 reports
summary information about the distribution of
HHI values across MSAs in 1999, 2006, and 2010.
The values reported in Panel A of Table 1 are based
on total deposits data for commercial banks only,
as in Dick (2006), whereas those reported in
Panel B are based on data for both commercial
banks and savings institutions.12 The information
in Panel A shows that both mean and median HHI
values declined by more than 100 points between
Wheelock
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8 The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of
each firm competing in a market—that is, HHI = Σimarket share2
i,
where there are i = 1,…, n firms in the market and market sharei
is the percentage of market output (deposits in the present context)
produced by the ith firm. Guidelines for the use of the HHI in anti  -
trust enforcement are established by the DOJ
(www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/6472.htm).
9 Regulators have defined some U.S. banking markets over larger
geographic areas, such as multiple counties, and occasionally
they redefine markets based on changes in commuting patterns,
trade areas, transportation networks, and so forth. Current defini-
tions for all U.S. banking markets are available from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (http://cassidi.stlouisfed.org/).
10 The relationship between concentration and competition is poten-
tially ambiguous. For example, if barriers to entry and exit are
sufficiently low, then even a monopolist will not earn excess profits
in the long run because other firms will enter and drive down the
market price if the incumbent firm sets its price above marginal
cost (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1988). See Berger et al. (2004) for
further discussion of the relationship between market concentra-
tion and competition and a review of recent research on the deter-
minants and effects of concentration and competition in banking.
11 See Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003) for references to these studies.
12 All subsequent tables in this article are divided similarly: Infor  -
mation reported in Panel A is based on data for commercial banks
only, whereas information reported in Panel B is based on data for
both commercial banks and savings institutions. Bank regulators
usually weight the deposits of savings institutions by 0.5 in calcu-
lating HHI values to measure the concentration of banking markets.
However, this article assigns them full weight but also presents
results based on data that exclude savings institution deposits
altogether.1999 and 2006 for commercial banks, whereas
the information in Panel B shows that median
HHI values declined by 93 points and mean HHI
values declined by 4 points for commercial banks
and savings institutions.13 Thus, for commercial
banks, the decline in mean and median HHI val-
ues between 1993 and 1999 at the MSA level
noted by Dick (2006) continued through 2006.
Further, these trends also continued during 2007-
10, despite the financial crisis and recession and
resulting wave of bank failures and mergers. 
Table 2 reports similar information for non-
MSA (i.e., “rural”) banking markets. Rural bank-
ing markets generally are more concentrated than
urban markets. For example, the median HHI
value for non-MSA counties in 2010 was 3195
(based on data for commercial banks only),
whereas the median HHI value for MSAs was
Wheelock
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13 Many commercial banks and savings institutions are controlled
by bank (or thrift) holding companies, which may have a control-
ling interest in more than one bank in a given market. Bank regu-
lators and the DOJ consider common control of multiple banks in
a market when evaluating proposed bank mergers. However, in
this article no adjustment is made for common control of multiple
banks in a market in calculating measures of market concentration,
which seems consistent with Dick’s (2006) approach. Although
failing to adjust for common ownership would tend to lead to
understatement of the HHI, on average, holding companies have
increasingly tended to merge their multiple bank subsidiaries into
a single bank, which lessens this bias in more recent years and,
more importantly, would tend to upwardly bias the unadjusted
changes in HHI over time. Hence, on average, increases in unad-
justed HHI likely overstate the extent to which concentration has
increased. Since the observed increases in unadjusted HHI in local
banking markets have been small, on average, the average increase
in concentration taking account of common control of multiple
banks in a market would likely be even smaller.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for the HHI (MSAs)
Bank type 1999 2006 2010
Panel A (commercial banks)
No. of markets 361 361 366
Minimum 516 515 539
Maximum 8006 8346 6666
Mean 1911.8 1760.7 1703.8
Q1 1375 1255 1188
Median 1746 1588 1459
Q3 2198 1971 1902
Standard deviation 905.92 867.02 860.39
Panel B (commercial banks and savings institutions)
No. of markets 361 361 366
Minimum 374 408 488
Maximum 5726 8145 7247
Mean 1530.6 1527.1 1535.8
Q1 1139 1089 1089
Median 1439 1346 1318
Q3 1750 1705 1689
Standard deviation 626.25 835.85 841.60
NOTE: Q1 is the first quartile of the distribution of the data; Q3 is the third quartile. Five cities were defined as MSAs between June
30, 2006, and June 30, 2010: Lake Havasu (AZ) and Palm Coast (FL) were designated as MSAs in December 2006; Cape Girardeau
(MO), Manhattan (KS), and Mankato-North Mankato (MN) were designated as MSAs in November 2008.1459. However, as with MSA markets, mean and
median HHI values for rural markets declined
between 1999 and 2010. Thus, in mid-2010, the
mean and median concentrations of both MSA
and rural banking markets were substantially
lower than in 1999 (and in 1993 for MSA mar-
kets) even though there were far fewer banks and
savings institutions in the United States in 2010
than in either 1993 or 1999.
Regional Concentration
That the substantial reduction in the number
of banks in the United States from the 1990s
through 2010 did not increase the average con-
centration of local banking markets is consistent
with the active enforcement of antitrust policy
by bank regulators and the DOJ, whose officials
generally deny bank merger applications that
would substantially increase the concentration
of local banking markets. However, antitrust
policy is not applied in banking over larger geo-
graphic areas, such as Census regions (though, as
noted previously, federal law prohibits individ-
ual banks from holding more than 10 percent of
total U.S. bank deposits, or 30 percent of a state’s
total deposits, if that level of deposits is obtained
through acquisitions of non-failed banks). Dick
(2006) finds that HHI values increased substan-
tially between 1993 and 1999 for all nine U.S.
Census regions. 
Table 3 reports HHI values for U.S. Census
regions for 1999, 2006, and 2010.14 HHI values
vary widely across U.S. Census regions. For 2010,
HHI values range from 341 for the East South
Wheelock
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14 Dick’s (2006) data exclude savings institutions and rural market
deposits. By contrast, the information reported in Table 3 is based
on data that include both MSA and rural deposits. However, HHI
values and trends are not qualitatively different from those reported
in Table 3 if rural deposits are excluded from the analysis.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for the HHI (Non-MSA Rural Counties)
Bank type 1999 2006 2010
Panel A (commercial banks)
No. of markets 2023 2024 2015
Minimum 830 891 839
Maximum 10000 10000 10000
Mean 4032.6 3821.5 3791.6
Q1 2405 2268 2243
Median 3399 3199 3195
Q3 5054 4831 4740
Standard deviation 2274.11 2187.70 2171.10
Panel B (commercial banks and savings institutions)
No. of markets 2027 2026 2017
Minimum 739 735 704
Maximum 10000 10000 10000
Mean 3684.3 3587.8 3594.9
Q1 2143 2073 2126
Median 3010 2955 2965  
Q3 4558 4392 4405
Standard deviation 2236.58 2153.05 2144.41
NOTE: Q1 is the first quartile of the distribution of the data; Q3 is the third quartile.Central region to 1377 for the New England region
(Panel A). However, regional HHI values increased
between 1999 and 2010 in each region except the
New England and the Pacific regions, with the
largest increases occurring between 1999 and
2006. When savings institutions are included in
the analysis (Panel B), the interregional range of
HHI values was narrower. In addition, HHI values
rose between 1999 and 2010 in all regions. Thus,
regardless of whether savings institutions are
included in the analysis, HHI values increased
in most, if not all, regions, indicating increased
concentration at the regional level. Further, in
most regions, a higher percentage of the increase
in HHI values occurred during 1999-2006 than
Wheelock
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during 2006-10. Thus, the financial crisis and
recession did not generally cause a substantial
increase in banking concentration, as reflected
in HHI values, at either local or regional levels.
DOMINANT AND FRINGE FIRMS
In addition to changes in market concentra-
tion, Dick (2006) also investigates changes over
time in the number of “dominant” and “fringe”
banks in urban and regional banking markets.
She defines dominant banks as the smallest set
of banks that jointly hold at least half of a market’s
total deposits. All other banks in a market are
fringe banks. Similarly, regionally dominant banks
Table 3
HHI Values (Census Regions) 
Census region 1999 2006 2010
Panel A (commercial banks)
New England 1419 1194 1377
Middle Atlantic 577 914 997
East North Central 135 284 381
West North Central 167 712 554
South Atlantic 589 845 639
East South Central 233 297 341
West South Central 285 501 508
Mountain 370 645 796
Pacific 1295 1155 1183
Panel B (commercial banks and savings institutions)
New England 571 539 669
Middle Atlantic 371 618 718
East North Central 101 226 315
West North Central 145 631 492
South Atlantic 473 600 517
East South Central 215 277 319
West South Central 229 416 446
Mountain 310 723 650
Pacific 784 781 1069
NOTE: U.S. Census regions include the following states: New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT); Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA); East North
Central (IN, IL, MI, OH, WI); West North Central (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD); South Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV);
East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN); West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX); Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NM, MT, UT, NV, WY); and Pacific
(AK, CA, HI, OR, WA).are those that jointly hold at least half of a region’s
total deposits. Dick (2006) finds that most urban
markets had two or three dominant banks in both
1993 and 1999. Further, the average number of
fringe banks fell slightly (from 19 banks to 18
banks), but the median number of fringe banks
was 11 banks in both years.
Table 4 reports summary statistics on the
number of dominant banks across MSAs for 1999,
2006, and 2010.15 The mean and median number
of dominant banks, based on data for only com-
mercial banks or for both commercial banks and
savings institutions, changed little between 1999
and 2010. The ranges also varied little across time.
Wheelock
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Table 5 shows the frequency distribution of the
number of dominant banks for each year. In 1999,
15 (of 361) MSAs had only one dominant bank
(Panel A). That number had increased slightly
by 2010, when 23 (of 366) MSAs had only one
dominant bank. However, the number of MSAs
with four or more dominant banks also increased
over time, from 48 (of 361) in 1999 to 86 (of 366)
in 2010.
As shown in Panel B of Table 4, the mean
number of dominant banks in MSA markets is
slightly larger if savings institutions are included
in the analysis, but the median remains at three
banks from 1999 to 2010 and the mean and median
numbers changed little between 1999 and 2010.
Furthermore, the number of markets with four or
more dominant banks increased from 107 (of 361)
in 1999 to 124 (of 366) in 2010 (see Table 5). Hence,
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Dominant Banks (MSAs)
Bank type 1999 2006 2010
Panel A (commercial banks)
No. of markets 361 361 366
Minimum 111
Maximum 877




Standard deviation 0.91 1.03 1.03
Panel B (commercial banks and savings institutions)
No. of markets 361 361 366
Minimum 111
Maximum 11 97




Standard deviation 1.08 1.14 1.07
NOTE: Q1 is the first quartile of the distribution of the data; Q3 is the third quartile. Five cities were defined as MSAs between June
30, 2006, and June 30, 2010: Lake Havasu (AZ) and Palm Coast (FL) were designated as MSAs in December 2006; Cape Girardeau (MO),
Manhattan (KS), and Mankato-North Mankato (MN) were designated as MSAs in November 2008.
15 As in calculating the HHI, this article makes no adjustments for
cases in which a single owner has a controlling interest in more
than one bank in a given market in calculating the number of
dominant banks in that market (see footnote 13).the results indicate that the decline in the num-
ber of banks in the United States since 1999 has
not caused the number of dominant banks in
most MSA banking markets to fall.
Rural (non-MSA) banking markets tend to be
more concentrated than urban banking markets.
Furthermore, Wheelock (2011) finds that acqui-
sitions of failed banks by in-market competitors
resulted in substantial increases in concentration
in some rural banking markets during 2007-10
but no significant increases in any large urban
markets. Table 6 reports information on the num-
Wheelock
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ber of dominant banks in rural markets in 1999,
2006, and 2010. The mean and median numbers
of dominant banks in rural markets are smaller
than those of MSA markets, reflecting the ten-
dency toward greater deposit concentration of
rural banking markets. However, as with MSAs,
the distributions of dominant banks in rural
markets changed little between 1999 and 2010
(Table 7). Thus, as reflected in both HHI values
and the distributions of dominant banks, and
regardless of whether savings institutions are
included in the analysis, the market structure of
Table 5
Distribution of the Number of Dominant Banks (MSAs)
1999 2006 2010
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Panel A (dominant commercial banks)
1 15 4.2 19 5.3 23 6.3
2 157 43.5 117 32.4 88 24.0
3 141 39.1 149 41.3 169 46.2
4 35 9.7 53 14.7 62 16.9
59 2.5 17 4.7 16 4.4
63 0.8 3 0.8 7 1.9
7— — 3 0.8 1 0.3
81 0.3 —— ——
Total MSAs 361 361 366
Panel B (dominant commercial banks and savings institutions)
17 1.9 15 4.2 15 4.1
2 83 23.0 66 18.3 69 18.9
3 164 45.4 153 42.4 158 43.2
4 76 21.1 83 23.0 84 23.0
5 22 6.1 34 9.4 30 8.2
65 1.4 6 1.7 9 2.5
73 0.8 2 0.6 1 0.3
8— — 1 0.3 ——
9— — 1 0.3 ——
10 —— —— ——
11 1 0.3 —— ——
Total MSAs 361 361 366
NOTE: Five cities were defined as MSAs between June 30, 2006, and June 30, 2010: Lake Havasu (AZ) and Palm Coast (FL) were designated
as MSAs in December 2006; Cape Girardeau (MO), Manhattan (KS), and Mankato-North Mankato (MN) were designated as MSAs in
November 2008.Wheelock
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for the Number of Dominant Banks (Non-MSA Rural Counties)
1999 2006 2010
Panel A (commercial banks)
No. of markets 2023 2024 2015
Minimum 111
Maximum 555




Standard deviation 0.69 0.73 0.74
Panel B (commercial banks and savings institutions)
No. of markets 2027 2026 2017
Minimum 111
Maximum 656




Standard deviation 0.77 0.80 0.78
NOTE: Q1 is the first quartile of the distribution of the data; Q3 is the third quartile.
Table 7
Distribution of the Number of Dominant Banks (Non-MSA Rural Counties)
1999 2006 2010
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Panel A (dominant commercial banks)
1 835 41.28 780 38.54 788 39.11
2 962 47.55 960 47.43 947 47.00
3 202 9.99 247 12.20 242 12.01
4 22 1.09 34 1.68 35 1.74
52 0.10 3 0.15 3 0.15
Total rural markets 2023 2024 2015
Panel B (dominant commercial banks and savings institutions)
1 699 34.48 694 34.25 705 34.95
2 979 48.30 927 45.76 951 47.15
3 298 14.70 354 17.47 306 15.17
4 46 2.27 40 1.97 49 2.43
53 0.15 11 0.54 5 0.25
62 0.10 ——1 0.05
Total rural markets 2027 2026 2017most local U.S. banking markets did not change
substantially between 1999 and 2010, despite
continued consolidation of the banking industry
as a whole.16
Regionally Dominant Banks
Dick (2006) finds that the number of region-
ally dominant banks declined by an average of
55 percent across Census regions from 1993 to
1999. Table 8 reports on the number of regionally
dominant banks in each Census region for 1999,
2006, and 2010. As shown in the table, the pattern
identified by Dick (2006) continued over the sub-
sequent decade in most regions, especially when
savings institutions are included in the analysis
(Panel B).17 The decline in the number of region-
ally dominant banks was especially pronounced
Wheelock
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16 Similarly, the average number of fringe banks did not change sub-
stantially over time in either MSA or rural banking markets.
17 Dick (2006) does not include savings institutions in her analysis.
She apparently also includes only banks located in MSAs in her
analysis of regionally dominant banks. The exclusion of rural banks
and bank branches has a larger impact on the calculation of the
number of regionally dominant banks in regions with higher per-
centages of deposits held outside MSAs. The West North Central
region had the highest percentage of bank deposits held outside
MSAs in 1999 at 38 percent. If rural banks are excluded from the
analysis, the West North Central region had 13, rather than 58,
regionally dominant banks in 1999 (the omission of savings insti-
tutions has a much smaller impact on the number of regionally
dominant banks). By contrast, in regions with a high percentage
of deposits held in MSAs, the omission of rural deposits has a much
smaller impact on the number of regionally dominant banks. The
Pacific region had the smallest percentage of deposits held outside
MSAs in 1999. If rural banks are omitted from the analysis, the
number of regionally dominant banks remains three. 
Table 8
Number of Regional Dominant Banks by Census Region
Census region 1999 2006 2010
Panel A (commercial banks)
New England 233
Middle Atlantic 755
East North Central 25 13 9
West North Central 58 20 11
South Atlantic 845
East South Central 14 13 15
West South Central 16 88
Mountain 965
Pacific 333
Panel B (commercial banks and savings institutions)
New England 986
Middle Atlantic 11 76
East North Central 35 17 12
West North Central 64 27 15
South Atlantic 13 77
East South Central 16 15 16
West South Central 20 11 9
Mountain 12 56
Pacific 554in the West North Central region, where the num-
ber of regionally dominant banks fell from 58 in
1999 to 20 in 2006, and to just 11 in 2010 (Panel A).
That is, in 1999, the largest 58 banks together held
50 percent of the West North Central region’s
deposits, but in 2006 the largest 20 banks held
50 percent of the region’s deposits, and in 2010
the largest 11 banks held 50 percent of the region’s
deposits. The number of regionally dominant
banks also fell substantially between 1999 and
2010 in the East North Central, South Atlantic,
and West South Central regions. Many states in
these four regions had prohibited or severely
restricted branching within their borders and
were among the last states to loosen their branch-
ing laws before the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act was enacted in
1994. Consequently, those states tended to have
large numbers of small- and medium-sized banks
and experienced more consolidation of their
banking systems during the 1990s than did many
states in the New England, Middle Atlantic, and
Pacific regions, which had long been more open to
statewide branching and were among the first to
enter into regional interstate banking compacts.18
Notably, even in regions with more regionally
dominant banks in 1999, the decline in the num-
ber of regionally dominant banks during 1999-
Wheelock
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Table 9
MSA and Regionally Dominant Banks by Census Region 
Mean No. of 
Mean No. of  MSA- and regionally 
MSA-dominant banks dominant banks in MSAs
Census region 1999 2006 2010 1999 2006 2010
Panel A (commercial banks)
New England 1.8 1.8 1.9 0.8 1.1 1.3
Middle Atlantic 2.6 2.5 2.5 0.9 0.6 0.8
East North Central 2.6 2.9 3.0 1.2 1.3 1.5
West North Central 3.2 3.6 3.6 2.1 1.9 1.6
South Atlantic 2.8 2.9 3.0 1.4 1.5 1.8
East South Central 3.0 3.4 3.2 1.9 2.1 2.2
West South Central 2.9 3.0 3.0 1.8 1.4 1.5
Mountain 2.4 2.7 2.6 1.4 1.6 1.2
Pacific 2.4 2.6 3.0 1.2 1.4 1.7
Panel B (commercial banks and savings institutions)
New England 2.8 3.1 2.9 1.2 1.5 1.6
Middle Atlantic 3.3 3.4 3.2 1.4 0.9 0.9
East North Central 3.2 3.1 3.2 1.6 1.7 1.7
West North Central 3.6 3.8 3.9 2.4 2.1 1.8
South Atlantic 3.1 3.2 3.3 1.6 1.6 1.8
East South Central 3.2 3.5 3.4 2.0 2.3 2.4
West South Central 3.2 3.1 3.1 1.9 1.5 1.4
Mountain 2.8 2.9 2.8 1.7 1.4 1.3
Pacific 3.2 3.3 3.1 1.6 2.0 1.8
18 Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Garrett, Wagner, and Wheelock
(2005) investigate the determinants of the timing of state deregu-
lation of branching and interstate banking laws in the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s.2006 generally was much larger than during
2006-10. For example, the number of regionally
dominant banks in the West South Central region
fell from 16 to 8 between 1999 and 2006 but was
still 8 in 2010 (based on data for commercial
banks only). Hence, the financial crisis and reces-
sion of 2007-09 apparently did not add momentum
to the ongoing trend toward greater concentration
of a region’s bank deposits in fewer banks.
Table 9 provides further information about
patterns of regionally dominant banks across
regions and over time. The table reports regional
averages for MSAs in 1999, 2006, and 2010 on (i)
the number of MSA-dominant banks and (ii) the
number of banks that are dominant in both the
MSA and its region.19 As Dick (2006) finds for
1993 and 1999, the average number of dominant
banks varies more across regions than it does
across time within regions. For example, based
on data for commercial banks only, MSAs in the
New England region had an average of 1.8 domi-
nant banks in 1999 and 2006 and 1.9 dominant
banks in 2010, whereas MSAs in the West North
Central region had an average of 3.2, 3.6, and
3.6 dominant banks in 1999, 2006, and 2010,
respectively. 
Dick (2006) also finds that the mean number
of banks dominant in both an MSA and its region
increased between 1993 and 1999. However, as
shown in Table 9, that trend did not continue
past 1999. The mean number of banks dominant
at both the MSA and regional levels changed little
between 1999 and 2010 in most regions, regard-
less of whether savings institutions are included
in the analysis. Again, there was more variation
across regions than over time. MSAs in the New
England and Middle Atlantic regions tended to
have the smallest numbers of banks that were
dominant in both the MSA and its region, whereas
the East South Central region generally had the
highest average number of such banks.
IMPACT OF MERGERS ON 
MARKET CONCENTRATION
(2007-10)
The recent financial crisis and recession led
to a wave of bank failures and mergers that con-
tributed to the ongoing consolidation of the U.S.
banking industry. As shown previously, the aver-
age concentration of local banking markets did
not increase during 2006-10. This section exam-
ines the impact on specific banking markets of
unassisted bank mergers during those years.
Wheelock (2011) finds that acquisitions of failed
banks by in-market competitors (i.e., banks that
already had branches in the markets served by
the failed bank) during 2007-10 did not substan-
tially increase concentration in most local bank-
ing markets. However, such acquisitions had a
substantial impact in a few, mostly rural, banking
markets. This section examines the impact on
market concentration of acquisitions of non-failed
banks by in-market competitors during those years.
Several large unassisted mergers involving
banks operating in the same local markets occurred
during 2007-10. Table 10 lists the 10 largest
unassisted bank mergers during 2007-10, ranked
by the total deposits held by the acquired institu-
tion as of the most recent June 30 before the merger.
For example, Wachovia Bank NA, which merged
with Wells Fargo Bank NA in March 2010, held
$394 billion of deposits on June 30, 2009. 
Although Wachovia Bank NA merged with
Wells Fargo Bank NA in March 2010, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System approved
the application of Wells Fargo & Company to
acquire Wachovia Corporation and its subsidiaries,
including Wachovia Bank NA, on October 12,
2008. Wachovia Bank and Wells Fargo Bank had
offices in common in several banking markets in
Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, and Texas.
In evaluating the competitive implications of an
acquisition of Wachovia Corporation by Wells
Fargo, the Board of Governors used deposit and
market share data for June 30, 2007 (adjusted to
Wheelock
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19 Banks that are dominant both within an MSA and within the region
in which the MSA is located are banks that are (i) among the group
of banks holding at least 50 percent of the deposits of the MSA and
(ii) among the group of banks holding at least 50 percent of the
deposits of the region. For example, in 2010, the largest five banks
in the St. Louis MSA held just over 50 percent of the MSA’s deposits.
Four of those banks were among the largest 11 banks that together
held just over 50 percent of the deposits of the West North Central
Census region. Hence, there were four banks in the St. Louis MSA




































































Ten Largest Unassisted Bank Mergers (2007-10)
Total deposits of  Total deposits of 
Date of holding company  acquired bank  acquiring bank 
Acquired bank Acquiring bank acquisition approval Date of merger ($ thousands) ($ thousands)
Wachovia Bank, NA Wells Fargo Bank, NA October 12, 2008 March 20, 2010 394,189,000 325,417,000
National City Bank PNC Bank, NA December 15, 2008 November 7, 2009 101,141,375 84,171,396
Wachovia Mortgage, FSB Wachovia Bank, NA September 29, 2006 October 12, 2007 73,243,232 314,850,000
Countrywide Bank, FSB Bank of America, NA June 5, 2008 April 27, 2009 63,336,672 642,252,215
Fifth Third Bank* Fifth Third Bank March 12, 2001 September 30, 2009 41,454,606 31,948,335
Commerce Bank, NA TD Bank, NA March 13, 2008 June 1, 2008 40,126,588 28,092,910
North Fork Bank Capital One, NA November 8, 2006 August 1, 2007 38,059,484 20,567,194
LaSalle Bank, NA Bank of America, NA September 14, 2007 October 17, 2008 29,594,901 642,252,215
Merrill Lynch Bank & Trust Co., FSB Bank of America, NA November 26, 2008 November 2, 2009 28,965,596 817,989,321
LaSalle Bank Midwest, NA Bank of America, NA September 14, 2007 October 17, 2008 25,011,471 642,252,215
NOTE: *Fifth Third Bank (Grand Rapids) and Fifth Third Bank (Cincinnati) were both subsidiaries of the Fifth Third Financial Corporation when they merged under the charter
of Fifth Third Bank (Cincinnati) in 2009. Hence, Fifth Third Bank (Cincinnati) is listed as the acquirer and Fifth Third Bank (Grand Rapids) as the acquired bank. reflect mergers and acquisitions through October 3,
2008).20 Wachovia Bank had only small shares
of most MSA banking markets in states where
Wells Fargo Bank operated, and consequently
the proposed acquisition would have had little
impact on concentration in most markets. How  -
ever, Wachovia Bank and Wells Fargo Bank both
had significant market shares in a few small MSA
and rural banking markets. For example, they had
the two largest market shares in the Santa Cruz,
California, banking market with 27 percent
(Wachovia) and 19 percent (Wells Fargo) shares.
However, in their application to acquire Wachovia,
Wells Fargo proposed to divest one of Wachovia
Bank’s branches in the Santa Cruz market to an
out-of market depository institution. Further, in
evaluating the competitive implications of the
proposed merger, the Board of Governors noted
the presence of several other banks and credit
unions with significant market shares in the
Santa Cruz market, as well as the recent entry into
the market of two other depository institutions.
Hence, the Board determined that the merger
would not adversely harm competition in the
Santa Cruz market.21 The Board of Governors
made similar determinations about the few other
banking markets where both Wachovia Bank and
Wells Fargo had relatively large market shares.
Although both Wachovia Bank NA and Wells
Fargo Bank NA were controlled by Wells Fargo &
Company when the banks were formally merged
in March 2010, an indication of the impact of the
merger on concentration in the Santa Cruz and
other markets is obtained by comparing deposits
and market share data for June 30, 2009, and
June 30, 2010. Based on data for June 30, 2009,
the HHI value for the Santa Cruz MSA was 1295,
indicating that the market was moderately con-
centrated by DOJ guidelines. Had Wachovia Bank
and Wells Fargo Bank been merged as of that date,
and assuming no other differences in the market,
the HHI value would have been 1832. Hence, a
simple pro forma analysis suggests that the merger
would produce a larger increase in market con-
centration than permitted by DOJ guidelines.
However, the divestiture of one of Wachovia
Bank’s branches in the Santa Cruz market reduced
the impact of the merger on market concentration.
In the event, the HHI value for the Santa Cruz
market rose by only 202 points, from 1295 to
1497, between June 30, 2009, and June 30, 2010,
and hence the market remained only moderately
concentrated.22
The acquisition of National City Bank by PNC
Bank NA in November 2009 was the second-
largest merger in terms of total deposits of the
acquired bank during 2007-10. The Board of
Governors approved the application of The PNC
Financial Services Group, Inc. (the parent com-
pany of PNC Bank NA) to acquire National City
Corporation (the parent of National City Bank) on
December 15, 2008. The Board relied on deposit
and market share data as of June 30, 2008 (adjusted
to reflect mergers and acquisitions through
November 4, 2008) to evaluate the competitive
implications of the acquisition on individual
banking markets. 
National City Bank and PNC Bank competed
directly in 10 banking markets in Florida,
Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and both had
substantial shares of the Erie and Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, markets. In its merger application,
PNC proposed to divest several National City
Bank branches in both the Pittsburgh and Erie
markets. In addition, the Board of Governors deter-
mined that a substantial portion of the deposits
held by PNC Bank in Pittsburgh were deposits of
customers located outside the Pittsburgh market,
including various municipalities and govern-
ments, and escrow accounts for mortgages and
other transactions outside the market. Conse  -
quently, the Board determined that, in effect,
PNC had a lower effective share of the Pittsburgh
Wheelock
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22 The change in HHI from one year to the next reflects all transac-
tions that occurred in a market during the year, not just the merger
of Wachovia Bank and Wells Fargo Bank, as well as fluctuations in
market shares associated with other deposit inflows and outflows.
20 The statement by the Board of Governors regarding the application
by Wells Fargo & Company to acquire Wachovia Corporation and
Wachovia’s subsidiary banks and non-banking companies is avail-
able on the Board’s website (www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/orders/orders20081021a1.pdf).
21 Credit unions are not required to report branch-level deposits data
and, hence, ordinarily they are excluded from calculation of mar-
ket concentration measures, such as the HHI. However, the Board
may consider the presence of credit unions in a market when
evaluating applications for bank mergers.Wheelock
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for the HHI in Overlapping Markets for Bank Mergers (2007-10)
MSAs Non-MSA rural counties
HHI before* HHI after† Difference‡ HHI before* HHI after† Difference‡
Panel A (Jan. 1, 2007–June 30, 2007)
No. of markets 51 51 51 34 34 34
Minimum 408.48 384.15 –223.25 1121.30 1092.81 –2163.01
Maximum 4625.70 4402.45 635.33 6147.01 4265.75 1727.43
Mean 1296.11 1327.00 30.89 2134.62 2358.65 224.03
Q1 910.27 891.98 –49.77 1579.61 1760.57 46.96
Median 1155.46 1114.97 –10.25 1934.33 2204.36 127.08
Q3 1495.06 1486.63 65.40 2538.31 2774.86 321.55
Standard deviation 659.00 705.13 151.71 935.73 899.10 598.69
Panel B (July 1, 2007–June 30, 2008)
No. of markets 116 116 116 47 47 47
Minimum 384.15 445.02 –244.30 977.23 1007.49 –272.30
Maximum 6559.93 6504.27 1945.82 4590.82 5691.28 2145.23
Mean 1312.70 1432.69 119.99 2124.46 2351.43 226.97
Q1 938.47 957.36 –0.06 1334.08 1493.10 30.26
Median 1165.13 1220.19 48.21 1799.53 1823.53 111.92
Q3 1450.68 1606.12 140.10 2773.81 2859.65 227.27
Standard deviation 753.37 855.27 298.28 968.02 1123.69 430.44
Panel C (July 1, 2008–June 30, 2009)
No. of markets 66 66 66 31 31 31
Minimum 445.02 439.99 –867.48 1113.50 1092.08 –156.84
Maximum 5631.98 5768.96 4684.56 4078.06 7956.74 3878.67
Mean 1398.88 1474.41 75.53 1971.28 2309.60 338.32
Q1 889.74 922.43 –65.89 1414.71 1493.24 2.68
Median 1189.65 1190.35 4.73 1843.44 2074.01 148.49
Q3 1489.83 1522.02 49.27 2254.19 2550.92 374.04
Standard deviation 933.90 1050.60 611.76 723.49 1331.83 721.43
Panel D (July 1, 2009–June 30, 2010)
No. of markets 78 78 78 21 21 21
Minimum 439.99 488.17 –2289.39 943.52 992.73 –421.80
Maximum 6802.87 7246.76 1551.94 3909.51 7410.51 3501.00
Mean 1462.61 1555.52 92.91 2100.92 2540.99 440.06
Q1 939.94 1033.07 4.67 1429.57 1542.64 81.51
Median 1230.18 1296.63 103.94 1892.44 1896.29 174.93
Q3 1441.67 1615.89 225.36 2333.82 2963.18 470.81
Standard deviation 1016.31 1074.24 397.97 840.29 1516.96 816.02banking market than suggested by the Summary
of Deposits data used in calculating market HHI
values.23 Furthermore, the Board noted that a
large number of banks (57) would remain in the
Pittsburgh market after the merger of PNC and
National City, and that 6 banking organizations
had entered the Pittsburgh market during the
previous 4 years. Similarly, considering the pro-
posed branch divestitures and the presence of
several other competitors, including four com-
munity credit unions, the Board determined that
competition in the Erie market would not be
adversely affected by PNC’s acquisition of
National City Bank.24
Between January 1, 2007, and June 30, 2010,
unassisted bank mergers occurred in 311 MSAs
and 133 rural counties where both merger part-
ners had existing offices. Table 11 presents sum-
mary information about changes in HHI values
from the most recent June 30 before a merger to
the June 30 immediately following the merger in
those markets.25 Thus, Panel A of the table reports
summary statistics for HHI values on June 30,
2006, and June 30, 2007, and the difference in HHI
values between those dates, for markets where
mergers occurred between January 1, 2007, and
June 30, 2007. Panel B reports summary statistics
for HHI values on June 30, 2007, and June 30,
2008, and the difference in HHI values between
those dates, for markets where mergers occurred
between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008. Panels C
and D report similar information for markets
where mergers occurred between July 1, 2008,
and June 30, 2009, and between July 1, 2009,
and June 30, 2010, respectively. Panel E presents
summary statistics for all markets where mergers
occurred between January 1, 2007, and June 30,
2010. 
The Board of Governors approved many of the
bank mergers that occurred between January 1,
Wheelock
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2011 435
25 Branch-level deposits data for June 30, 2011, are not yet available
to calculate changes in HHI values in markets in which mergers
occurred between July 1 and December 31, 2010.
23 Many banking organizations book the deposits of out-of-market
customers at their headquarters location, which distorts market
share and HHI values as measures of local market concentration,
and is one reason why the Board of Governors and DOJ consider
other indicators of market competition in addition to HHI values
when evaluating bank merger applications.
24 The order approving the merger of acquisition of National City
Corporation by PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. is available on
the Board of Governor’s website (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/orders/orders20081215a1.pdf).
Table 11, cont’d
Descriptive Statistics for the HHI in Overlapping Markets for Bank Mergers (2007-10)
MSAs Non-MSA rural counties
HHI before* HHI after† Difference‡ HHI before* HHI after† Difference‡
Panel E (Jan. 1, 2007–June 30, 2010)
No. of markets 311 311 311 133 133 133
Minimum 384.15 384.15 –2289.39 943.52 992.73 –2163.01
Maximum 6802.87 7246.76 4684.56 6147.01 7956.74 3878.67
Mean 1365.87 1455.02 89.15 2087.64 2373.46 285.82
Q1 925.60 955.38 –25.91 1429.57 1542.64 38.49
Median 1177.98 1247.80 31.20 1837.30 2062.67 134.45
Q3 1476.66 1600.65 146.01 2531.96 2719.63 301.14
Standard deviation 851.16 935.48 394.31 880.71 1183.03 616.44
NOTE: The summary statistics exclude all market overlaps for mergers that occurred after June 30, 2010. *“HHI before” corresponds to
the HHI value on the June 30 before the merger date; †“HHI after” corresponds to the HHI value on the June 30 after the merger date;
‡“Difference” corresponds to the change between the HHI value from the June 30 before the merger date and the HHI value on the
June 30 after the merger date.2007, and June 30, 2007, in 2006 or before. In
doing so, the Board would have relied on deposits
and market share information from before June 30,
2006, when evaluating the competitive implica-
tions of those mergers. Nonetheless, comparison
of HHI values based on data for June 30, 2006, and
June 30, 2007, shows how mergers that occurred
between January 1, 2007, and June 30, 2007,
affected market concentration, regardless of when
those mergers were approved. Similarly, compari-
son of HHI values based on data for June 30, 2007,
and June 30, 2008, shows the impact of mergers
that occurred between July 1, 2007, and June 30,
2008, on market concentration, regardless of when
the Board of Governors approved those mergers.
Hence, the data underlying the summary infor-
mation reported in Table 11 include mergers that
were consummated during the period indicated,
regardless of when the mergers were approved. 
As reported in Panel E, for MSAs, for the
entire period January 1, 2007, through June 30,
2010, the mean and median changes in HHI val-
ues over the 12-month periods during which one
or more bank mergers occurred were 89 and 31
points, respectively. For individual years, the
mean (median) changes range from 31 points (–10
points) to 120 points (104 points). The range of
changes in HHI values was very wide, from –2289
points to 4685 points across all MSAs where one
or more unassisted mergers of banks occurred
between January 1, 2007, and June 30, 2010. Of
course, mergers are just one cause of changes in
HHI values from one year to the next. Other rea-
sons for changes in HHI values include bank fail-
ures, de novo entry, reassignment of deposits
among a bank’s branches, and other changes in
the distribution of deposits across banks not
associated with mergers.
For rural counties over the entire period, the
mean and median changes in HHI values were
286 and 134 points, respectively. For individual
years, the mean (median) changes range from
224 (112) points to 440 (175) points. Hence, HHI
values tended to increase more in rural counties
where mergers occurred than in MSAs. In general,
rural banking markets are more concentrated than
urban markets. Among rural counties where
mergers occurred, the mean HHI value before a
merger was 2088 points, compared with 1366
points in MSAs. Many rural banking markets span
more than one county, however, and as noted
previously, banking regulators may consider the
presence of credit unions and other factors that
are not reflected in HHI values when evaluating
the competitive effects of proposed bank mergers.
Nonetheless, it appears that, on average, unas-
sisted bank mergers during 2007-10 had a larger
impact on concentration in rural counties than
in MSA banking markets; Wheelock (2011) finds
a similar result for mergers involving failed banks.
CONCLUSION
The number of U.S. commercial banks and
savings institutions declined by 1,011, or about
12 percent, between December 31, 2006, and
December 31, 2010. Unassisted mergers of non-
failed banks eliminated 1,002 banks during this
period, whereas failures eliminated 324 banks
(the chartering of new banks, voluntary liquida-
tions, and other changes resulted in a net addition
of 315 banks). The consolidation of the banking
industry during 2007-10 continued a trend begun
in the mid-1980s. Advances in information-
processing and other technologies and the result-
ing economies of scale have encouraged growth
in the size of banks, which deregulation of bank
branching, first by states and later by the federal
government, has facilitated.26
Banking industry consolidation has been
marked by sharply higher shares of U.S. bank
deposits held by the largest banks, as well as
increased concentration of deposits measured 
at the level of U.S. Census regions. This article
extends prior research on the structure of U.S.
banking markets by investigating changes in
deposit concentration at both the local and
regional levels. It shows that trends toward
increased concentration at the regional level in
the 1990s continued through 2010. However, con-
centration of local banking markets has changed
26 Berger (2003) discusses the implications of technological progress
for the banking industry, whereas Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001)
and Wheelock and Wilson (forthcoming) report evidence of signifi-
cant economies of scale in banking.
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crisis and recession when several large bank
mergers occurred. Further, the average number
of banks holding at least 50 percent of deposits
in a region declined over time in most U.S. Census
regions, but the number holding at least 50 per-
cent of deposits in local banking markets remained
fairly constant over time. Antitrust policy is predi-
cated on the assumption that banking markets
are local in nature, and enforcement has helped
keep local banking markets from becoming sig-
nificantly more concentrated.
The article also examines the effects on local
market concentration of mergers of banks operat-
ing in the same markets. Two of the largest merg-
ers during 2007-10 were the merger of Wachovia
Bank with Wells Fargo Bank and the merger of
National City Bank with PNC Bank. In approving
these applications, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System noted plans to divest
local branch offices and other mitigating circum-
stances that offset pro forma analysis of market
concentration levels based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. Further, the article finds that
deposit concentration did not increase to the
extent predicted by simple pro forma analysis in
markets where these mergers had raised the most
serious concerns about their competitive effects.
Finally, the article finds that deposit concentra-
tion did not increase substantially, on average,
in local banking markets where any unassisted
mergers occurred during 2007-10, though rural
counties generally saw larger average increases
in concentration than urban markets. 
Changes in regulation and technology have
reduced the cost of obtaining banking services
from distant banks. However, many consumers
continue to rely exclusively on local banks for
financial services and evidence suggests that the
pricing of banking services continues to reflect,
at least in part, the structure of local banking mar-
kets. The recent financial crisis and recession did
not alter the trend toward industry consolidation
or change patterns of concentration at either the
local or regional levels. Antitrust enforcement
has ensured that the structures of local banking
markets have not changed significantly as a result
of unassisted mergers and acquisitions, even as
the industry as a whole has consolidated and total
U.S. deposits have become increasingly concen-
trated among the very largest banks. As technology
evolves and the costs of obtaining banking ser  -
vices from distant providers fall further, however,
local market characteristics may become less rel-
evant for analysis of competition in banking.
Wheelock
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